




Spring 2025

12 Emerging Topic II: Autonomous vehicles

CML-477 Transportation network modeling & analysis



- History and state-of-art of autonomous driving
 - Earliest developments
 - 1961 Remote-control lunar rover developed at Stanford
 - 1977 Semi-autonomous car developed at Tsukuba Mechanical Engineering Laboratory
 - 1980-1990 VaMoRs (Visual Autonomous Mobile Robot System) with a full vision system developed at Bundeswehr University Munich



Stanford Cart



VaMoRs

- History and state-of-art of autonomous driving
 - Recent advances
 - 2015 Tesla Autopilot: Adaptive cruise control for highway driving
 - 2015 Mcity: AV test field by University of Michigan



M City, Michigan

Overview

- History and state-of-art of autonomous driving
 - Recent advances
 - 2017 Waymo: Robotaxi with a backup driver
 - 2018-2020 Launch of several robotaxi and robodelivery services in US cities



Waymo



Nuro




Waymo in Phoenix

- History and state-of-art of autonomous driving
 - Levels of automation

- Adaptive cruise control
- Lane-keeping


- Traffic jam pilot



Overview

- History and state-of-art of autonomous driving
 - Levels of automation


- Robotaxi



- History and state-of-art of autonomous driving
 - \$300-400 billion in revenue by 2035 (McKinsey, 2023)

Advanced driver-assistance systems (ADAS) and autonomous-driving (AD) revenues, \$ billion


- Level 4 (high driving automation)
- Level 3 (conditional driving automation)
- Level 2 (partial driving automation)
- Level 1 (driver assistance)




- Key factors and impacts on urban transportation systems
 - Mixed traffic of human-driven vehicles and AVs for a long time

Indicators of consumer interest in owning fully autonomous vehicles (AVs), % of respondents


Readiness to switch to AV¹










Trust in the safety of AVs²



Consumer support for government regulation³



Factors that would increase consumer confidence in AVs, % of respondents



Safety has to increase

Need to test the autonomous-driving (AD) function myself

More regulations regarding AVs have to be introduced

OEMs have to give more information on the technology

Need to read more about it in news (eg, newspaper)

Having friends/family members test the AD function

Other players should offer AD


¹Question: If the car maker of your choice offered a fully autonomous car, would you want to keep your old car or switch at the same costs? Answers included "I would definitely switch to a fully autonomous car" or "I would rather switch to a fully autonomous car."

²Responses to the statement: I would feel good with my family members driving in a fully autonomous car.

³Question: Do you think the government should legalize fully autonomous vehicles on all roads?


Source: McKinsey Center for Future Mobility ACES Consumer Survey, Dec 2021, n = 26,285

- Key factors and impacts on urban transportation systems
 - Mixed traffic of human-driven vehicles and AVs for a long time
 - Road safety is expected to improve with a wide adaption of AVs
 - 94% of highway deaths are attributed to human errors
 - First reported pedestrian killed by Uber AV in 2018



- Key factors and impacts on urban transportation systems
 - Mixed traffic of human-driven vehicles and AVs for a long time
 - Road safety is expected to improve with a wide adaption of AVs
 - Private “driving” will become less stressful and more enjoyable
 - Provide mobility solution to those who cannot drive
 - Private vehicle ownership will possibly be replaced by a subscription of AV service
 - e.g., Tesla’s vision of cybercab city

- Influences on traffic congestion




- Induce more vehicle trips due to cost saving and enhanced mobility
- More cruising traffic due to self-parking

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nvbZK6Yf5PA>

- Smooth traffic flow and prevent "phantom congestion"
- Increase road capacity by reducing car following gap
- Enable adaptive traffic control and management


<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Suugn-p5C1M>




- Traffic dynamics
 - Road capacity enhancement
- Route control
 - System optimum (SO) and fleet optimum (FO)
- Dedicated infrastructures
 - AV lane and AV zone

Link capacity with AVs

- From microscopic behaviors to macroscopic modeling



Road capacity



Link capacity with AVs

- Revised BPR function

- Link travel time

$$t = t_0 \left[1 + 0.15 \left(\frac{x}{s} \right)^4 \right]$$

- t_0 : free-flow link travel time

- Total link flow


$$x = x_{HV} + x_{AV}$$

- x_{HV}, x_{AV} : link flow of human-driven (HV) vehicles and AVs

- Link capacity

$$s = s_0 (1 + \alpha r^2)$$

- s_0 : base link capacity (all HVs)
- $r = x_{AV}/x$: fraction of AVs
- $\alpha = s_{AV}/s_0 - 1$: capacity improvement with all AVs



- Equilibrium conditions

$$(\mathbf{f}^*)^T(\mathbf{c}^* - \Lambda^T \boldsymbol{\mu}^*) = 0$$

Complementary condition of path flows

$$\mathbf{c}^* - \Lambda^T \boldsymbol{\mu}^* \geq 0$$

Min path cost

$$\Lambda \mathbf{f}^* = \mathbf{q}$$

Demand flow conservation

$$\mathbf{f}^* \geq 0$$

Path flow feasibility

- Demand flow $\mathbf{q} = [\mathbf{q}_{HV}, \mathbf{q}_{AV}]$
- Path flow $\mathbf{f} = [\mathbf{f}_{HV}, \mathbf{f}_{AV}]$

- ***Q: Which traffic assignment extension this problem belong to?***

- Equilibrium conditions

$$(\mathbf{f}^*)^T(\mathbf{c}^* - \Lambda^T \mu^*) = 0$$

Complementary condition of path flows

$$\mathbf{c}^* - \Lambda^T \mu^* \geq 0$$

Min path cost

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- Path flow $\mathbf{f} = [\mathbf{f}_{HV}, \mathbf{f}_{AV}]$

- ***Q: Which traffic assignment extension this problem belong to?***
- Heterogenous users

$$t_a^{HV}(x_a^{HV}, x_a^{AV}) = t_a^{AV}(x_a^{AV}, x_a^{HV}) = t_0 \left[1 + 0.15 \left(\frac{x_a^{AV} + x_a^{HV}}{s_a(x_a^{AV}, x_a^{HV})} \right)^4 \right]$$

- Symmetry of link interactions

For $k \in \{HV, AV\}$,

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial t_a}{\partial x_a^k} &= \frac{\partial}{\partial x_a^k} \left\{ t_0 \left[1 + 0.15 \left(\frac{x_a^{AV} + x_a^{HV}}{s_a} \right)^4 \right] \right\} \\ &= 0.6t_0 \left(\frac{x_a}{s_a} \right)^3 \frac{\partial}{\partial x_a^k} \left(\frac{x_a^{AV} + x_a^{HV}}{s_a} \right) \\ &= 0.6t_0 \left(\frac{x_a}{s_a} \right)^3 \frac{1}{s_a^2} \left[s_a - (x_a^{AV} + x_a^{HV}) \frac{\partial s_a}{\partial x_a^k} \right]\end{aligned}$$

- Jacobian matrix of link costs $\nabla t(x)$ is symmetric iff $\nabla s(x)$ is symmetric
- **Q: Does this symmetry condition hold?**

- Symmetry of link interactions

For $k \in \{HV, AV\}$,

$$\frac{\partial s_a}{\partial x_a^k} = \frac{\partial}{\partial x_a^k} \left\{ s_{0,a} \left[1 + \alpha \left(\frac{x_a^{AV}}{x_a} \right)^2 \right] \right\} = 2\alpha s_{0,a} \frac{\partial}{\partial x_a^k} \left(\frac{x_a^{AV}}{x_a} \right)$$

$$\frac{\partial s_a}{\partial x_a^{HV}} = \frac{2\alpha s_{0,a}}{x_a^2} (-x_a^{AV})$$

$$\frac{\partial s_a}{\partial x_a^{AV}} = \frac{2\alpha s_{0,a}}{x_a^2} (x_a - x_a^{AV}) = \frac{2\alpha s_{0,a}}{x_a^2} (x_a^{HV})$$

- Jacobian matrix of link costs $\nabla t(x)$ is asymmetric because $\nabla s(x)$ is asymmetric

Link capacity with AVs

- Symmetry of link interactions

For $k \in \{HV, AV\}$,

$$\frac{\partial s_a}{\partial x_a^k} = \frac{\partial}{\partial x_a^k} \left\{ s_{0,a} \left[1 + \alpha \left(\frac{x_a^{AV}}{x_a} \right)^2 \right] \right\} = 2\alpha s_{0,a} \frac{\partial}{\partial x_a^k} \left(\frac{x_a^{AV}}{x_a} \right)$$

$$\frac{\partial s_a}{\partial x_a^{HV}} = \frac{2\alpha s_{0,a}}{x_a^2} (-x_a^{AV})$$

* Link capacity increases with x_a^{AV} but decreases with x_a^{HV}


$$\frac{\partial s_a}{\partial x_a^{AV}} = \frac{2\alpha s_{0,a}}{x_a^2} (x_a - x_a^{AV}) = \frac{2\alpha s_{0,a}}{x_a^2} (x_a^{HV})$$

- Jacobian matrix of link costs $\nabla t(x)$ is not only asymmetric but also non-monotone
 - there may exist multiple equilibria $[\mathbf{f}_{HV}^*, \mathbf{f}_{AV}^*]$

▪ Case study

- A network with single OD and two parallel links

$$\begin{aligned} q_{HV} &= 1 \\ q_{AV} &= 1 \end{aligned}$$




- Link travel time
 - $t_0 = 1$
- Link capacity
 - $s_0 = \alpha = 1$

$$t_a = 1 + 0.15 \left(\frac{x_a^{HV} + x_a^{AV}}{s_a} \right)^4$$


$$s_a = 1 + \left(\frac{x_a^{AV}}{x_a^{HV} + x_a^{AV}} \right)^2$$

Link capacity with AVs

- Case study
 - Multiple equilibria with different total travel time



Equilibrium




Equilibrium total travel time

Link capacity with AVs

- Case study

- Multiple equilibria with different total travel time
- Induce optimal equilibrium via different day-to-day dynamics





Questions?

- Traffic dynamics
 - Road capacity enhancement
- ➡ ▪ Route control
 - System optimum (SO) and fleet optimum (FO)
- Dedicated infrastructures
 - AV lane and AV zone

- Mixed traffic equilibrium with HVs and AVs
 - Different impacts on link travel time

$$t = t_0 \left[1 + 0.15 \left(\frac{x_{HV} + x_{AV}}{s} \right)^4 \right]$$

$$s = s_0 \left[1 + \alpha \left(\frac{x_{AV}}{x_{HV} + x_{AV}} \right)^2 \right]$$

- Different routing principle
 - HV as UE travelers
 - choose route to min self travel time
 - AV as SO travelers
 - choose route to min total travel time

▪ ***Q: How to model this traffic assignment problem?***

- Mixed traffic equilibrium with HVs and AVs
 - Different impacts on link travel time

$$t = t_0 \left[1 + 0.15 \left(\frac{x_{HV} + x_{AV}}{s} \right)^4 \right]$$

$$s = s_0 \left[1 + \alpha \left(\frac{x_{AV}}{x_{HV} + x_{AV}} \right)^2 \right]$$

- Different routing principle
 - HV as UE travelers
 - choose route to min self travel time
 - AV as SO travelers
 - choose route to min total travel time

- Equilibrium conditions

For $k \in \{HV, AV\}$,

$$(\mathbf{f}_k^*)^T (\mathbf{c}_k^* - \Lambda^T \boldsymbol{\mu}_k^*) = 0$$

$$\mathbf{c}_k^* - \Lambda^T \boldsymbol{\mu}_k^* \geq \mathbf{0}$$

$$\Lambda \mathbf{f}_k^* = \mathbf{q}_k$$

$$\mathbf{f}_k^* \geq \mathbf{0}$$

Complementary condition of path flows

Min path cost

Demand flow conservation

Path flow feasibility

- Path cost for HVs $\mathbf{c}_{HV} = \Delta \mathbf{t}$
- Path cost for AVs $\mathbf{c}_{AV} = \Delta m\mathbf{t}$
 - marginal link travel time

$$mt(x) = \frac{\partial xt(x)}{\partial x} = t(x) + xt'(x) = t_0 \left[1 + 0.75 \left(\frac{x_{HV} + x_{AV}}{s} \right)^4 \right]$$

- Optimal route control of AVs
 - The higher penetration rate of AVs and the control ratio, the closer the system approaches SO
- ***Q: Is it necessary to control all AVs to min total travel time?***

- Optimal route control of AVs
 - The higher penetration rate of AVs and the control ratio, the closer the system approaches SO
 - Key idea: Only control travel flows that contribute the most to congestion

LEADER:

Traffic manager

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{\tilde{\mathbf{q}}} \quad & TT(\mathbf{x}^*) + \gamma \|\tilde{\mathbf{q}}\|_1 \\ \text{s. t.} \quad & 0 \leq \tilde{\mathbf{q}} \leq \mathbf{q}_{AV} \end{aligned}$$

- $TT(\cdot)$: total travel time
- $\tilde{\mathbf{q}}, \mathbf{q}_{AV}$: controlled/AV demand
- γ : weight parameter

FOLLOWERS:

**Travelers w/ and
w/o control**

$$\langle \mathbf{T}(\mathbf{x}^*), \mathbf{x} - \mathbf{x}^* \rangle \geq 0, \quad \forall \mathbf{x} \in \Omega_x(\tilde{\mathbf{q}})$$

- $\mathbf{T}(\cdot)$: joint link cost function
- \mathbf{x}^*, \mathbf{x} : (equilibrium) link flow belong to Ω_x

- Optimal route control of AVs
 - The higher penetration rate of AVs and the control ratio, the closer the system approaches SO
 - Key idea: Only control travel flows that contribute the most to congestion

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- γ : weight parameter

* Balance total travel time saving and control intensity

FOLLOWERS:
Travelers w/ and
w/o control


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- $\mathbf{T}(\cdot)$: joint link cost function
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Routing of AVs


- Optimal route control of AVs
 - Sioux Falls network
 - 24 nodes, 76 links, 528 OD pairs
 - BPR function as link travel time
 - Uniform AV penetration rate
 - Test policy
 - Optimal route control scheme (ORCS)
 - Benchmark policy
 - Uniform route control scheme (URCS)
 - Same control ratio for all OD pairs

Zhang & Nie. Mitigating the impact of selfish routing: An optimal-ratio control scheme (ORCS) inspired by autonomous driving. TRC, 2018




Routing of AVs

- Optimal route control of AVs
 - Approach SO with 10% AVs being controlled





Total travel time vs AV penetration



Control ratio vs AV penetration

Routing of AVs

- Optimal route control of AVs
 - Some OD pairs are selected and fully controlled, while the others are not controlled at all




- Optimal route control of AVs
 - What if AVs are not controlled by the traffic manager but the AV company
 - the goal is no longer min total travel time of all travelers but only AV users
 - Another mixed traffic equilibrium
 - HV as UE travelers
 - choose route to min self travel time
 - AV as fleet optimum (FO) travelers
 - choose route to min total travel time of AVs
 - path cost based on marginal link travel time wrt AV flow

$$\begin{aligned}mt_{AV}(x) &= \frac{\partial \mathbf{x}_{AV} t(x)}{\partial \mathbf{x}_{AV}} = t(x) + \mathbf{x}_{AV} t'(x) \\&= t_0 \left[1 + \left(0.15 + \frac{0.6 \mathbf{x}_{AV}}{\mathbf{x}_{HV} + \mathbf{x}_{AV}} \right) \left(\frac{\mathbf{x}_{HV} + \mathbf{x}_{AV}}{s} \right)^4 \right]\end{aligned}$$

- Optimal route control of AVs
 - The higher penetration rate of AVs, the closer FO approaches SO
- ***Q: Does FO always lead to less congestion than UE?***

Routing of AVs

- Optimal route control of AVs
 - The higher penetration rate of AVs, the closer FO approaches SO
 - FO may result in more congestion when fleet penetration is low
 - Two Critical fleet sizes (CFS)
 - CFS-UE: largest fleet to maintain UE
 - CFS-SO: smallest fleet to induce SO






Questions?

- Traffic dynamics
 - Road capacity enhancement
- Route control
 - System optimum (SO) and fleet optimum (FO)
- ▪ Dedicated infrastructures
 - AV lane and AV zone


Dedicated network for AVs

- What are AV lanes and AV zones, and why?
 - Roads and regions that only allow AVs to enter
 - Motivated by the higher driving efficiency of AVs

mixed traffic



separate traffic



- ***Q: How to model AV lanes and AV zones in traffic assignment?***

- Mixed traffic equilibrium with HVs and AVs
 - Different impacts on link travel time
 - adjust link travel time function
 - Different routing principle
 - adjust definition of path cost
 - Different routing network
 - adjust accessible links and feasible paths

Dedicated network for AVs

- Optimal design of AV infrastructure

LEADER:

Network designer

$$\begin{aligned} \min_z \quad & TT(\mathbf{x}^*) + \gamma g(\mathbf{z}) \\ \text{s. t.} \quad & \mathbf{z} \in Z \end{aligned}$$

- $TT(\cdot)$: total travel time
- $g(\cdot)$: construction cost
- γ : weight parameter
- Z : set of feasible designs

* Balance total travel time saving and construction cost

FOLLOWERS:
HVs and AVs

$$\langle \mathbf{t}(\mathbf{x}^*), \mathbf{x} - \mathbf{x}^* \rangle \geq 0, \quad \forall \mathbf{x} \in \Omega_x(\mathbf{z})$$

- $\mathbf{t}(\cdot)$: joint link cost function
- \mathbf{x}^*, \mathbf{x} : (equilibrium) link flow belong to Ω_x

* Feasible link flows correspond to different AV network designs

- Q: What is the key challenge solving this problem?

Dedicated network for AVs

- Optimal design of AV infrastructure

LEADER:

Network designer

$$\begin{aligned} \min_z \quad & TT(\mathbf{x}^*) + \gamma g(\mathbf{z}) \\ \text{s. t. } & \mathbf{z} \in Z \end{aligned}$$

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HVs and AVs

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- $\mathbf{t}(\cdot)$: joint link cost function
- \mathbf{x}^*, \mathbf{x} : (equilibrium) link flow belong to Ω_x

* Feasible link flows correspond to different AV network designs

- Q: *What is overlooked in this formulation?*

Dedicated network for AVs

- Optimal design of AV infrastructure
 - Hypothetical grid network




Candidate zone



Optimal zone

Chen, et al. Optimal design of autonomous vehicle zones in transportation networks. " TRB, 2017.



Dedicated network for AVs

- Optimal design of AV infrastructure
 - Hypothetical grid network

	w/o AV zone (10^6 min)	w/ AV zone (10^6 min)	
Total travel time	4.17	3.28	21%
TT inside AV zone	0.47	0.20	57%
TT outside AV zone	3.70	3.08	17%

